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Energy trade has developed into one of the most contentious and divisive issues between Russia and EU in the post-
Cold War era. It reflects a broader geoeconomic struggle in which economic means are used to advocate geopolitical 
goals. This Working Paper argues that the case of the South Stream Pipeline Project (SSPP) – a grand project abruptly 
cancelled by President Putin in December 2014 – epitomizes these broader power politics involved in the energy 
relations between the two powers. In 2014 the Russian leadership advanced both traditional geopolitical and 
contemporary geoeconomic strategies, pursuing the former by conducting a military campaign in Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine, and utilizing the latter by pushing the construction of South Stream in spite of the EU’s legal and political 
objections. The EU was able to harden its line on SSPP. The global energy context, including cheap coal prices, 
expansion of renewable energies, more liquefied natural gas and spot trading, cannot fully account for the assertiveness 
of the EU Commission and the allegiance of Member States in the SSPP case. The results of the process tracing 
conducted in this Working Paper confirm that in the case of the SSPP, Russian traditional geopolitics greatly hindered 
its geoeconomic power towards the EU. Furthermore, the Working Paper suggests that the strategic choices of 
geoeconomics vs. geopolitics may be more generally incompatible, even mutually exclusive. Russian geoeconomic 
activity has long been successful as a centrifugal, dividing power within the EU. The geopolitical campaign in Ukraine, 
in stark contrast, has been a centripetal force, causing increasing EU unity, eventually also seen in the SSPP case. It 
seems that claims of geoeconomics being a continuation of war by other means are potentially misleading. The means 





In the post-Cold War era, energy security and trade between the European Union (EU) and the Russian 
Federation (Russia) were projected to become the glue that binds the two powers together in peaceful and 
prosperous trade relations based on mutual benefit and interdependence1 – despite the growing asymmetry 
between liberal approaches to the energy sector in the EU and the illiberal state-centric environment in 
Russia.2 In the current state of affairs, however, energy trade reflects a broader geoeconomic struggle in 
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1 See Haukkala, H. 2014. “Towards a Pan-European energy order? Energy as an object of contention in EU-Russia 
relations”, Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence Vol.12 No.4, pp. 1-26 and Dizdarevic, N. 2014. “Regulatory Aspects 
Behind a Realization of the South Stream”, Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence Vol.12, Issue 2. 
2 Aalto, P. (ed.), The EU-Russian Energy Dialogue: Europe’s Future Energy Security (Ashgate Publishing, 2008) and 
Van Der Meulen E. F., 2009. “Gas Supply and EU–Russia Relations,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 61, No. 5, pp. 833-
856. 
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which economic means are used to advocate geopolitical goals. The concept of geoeconomics rivals both 
economic liberalism and traditional geopolitics as the paradigm of foreign and economic policies of states, 
and the evaluation of their national interests.3 Geoeconomics challenges the liberal interdependency 
paradigm by underscoring the strategic interests – zero-sum interests that do not function in the logic of 
commerce – in economic relations between states.4 At the same time, departing from traditional geopolitics, 
which connotes conventional military power projection,5 geoeconomics highlights softer, economic versions 
of balancing behavior. 
This paper argues that the case of the South Stream Pipeline Project (SSPP) epitomizes the 
geoeconomic power politics involved in the energy relations between the EU and Russia. For Russia, the 
SSPP has been an instrument of a geoeconomic strategy to advance specific goals: to secure Russian 
influence in Ukraine; to maintain Gazprom’s dominant market share in the EU; to maintain the Russian 
sphere of influence on the EU Member States which rely on Russian energy; and to undermine European 
unity in energy and foreign policy.6 For the EU, by contrast, opposition against the SSPP stems from the 
long-term policy goal of limiting the Russian geoeconomic influence within the EU, framed as concern over 
energy security and the functioning of the single EU energy market.  
The process tracing presented in this article examines the demise of SSPP especially against 
the hypothesis that the EU-level opposition to the project and Member State adherence was strengthened as a 
result of Russian military aggression in Ukraine. The process tracing draws on public sources,7 and 
establishes the key trajectories of change and causal sequence both on the EU and the Russian side. Careful 
description is the foundation of process tracing, and a crucial building block for analysis.8 The results 
confirm the hypothesis that, in the case of the SSPP, Russian geopolitics greatly hindered its geoeconomic 
power vis-à-vis the EU. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that the big strategic choices of geoeconomics vs. 
geopolitics may be generally more incompatible, perhaps even mutually exclusive. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, it discusses geoeconomics as a framework for foreign 
policy analysis, outlining the main drivers of the current interest in geoeconomics. The paper then turns to 
the context of geoeconomics in natural gas trade between Russia and the EU. It outlines the principles behind 
the EU-level gas policy, the conflicting interests of Member States, and the geoeconomic divide et impera 
strategy of Russia towards the EU. Subsequently, the paper presents a detailed case study of the SSPP, which 
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3 For the evolution and a comparison of geoeconomic schools of thought in Russia and the Western Europe and the 
United States, see Anokhin A. and Lachininskii S., 2015. Evolution of the Ideas and Contents of Geoeconomic Studies, 
Regional Research of Russia, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 90-95. 
4 Luttwak, E. 1990. “From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce”, The National 
Interest Vol. 20, pp. 125-130. 
5 Flint, C.  Introduction to Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 28. 
$!Liuhto, K. 2010. Energy in Russia’s Foreign Policy, Electronic Publications of Pan-European Institute 10/2010, p. 36. 
available at: http://www.utu.fi/fi/yksikot/tse/yksikot/PEI/raportit-ja-tietopaketit/Documents/Liuhto_final_netti.pdf.!
7 The most useful sources for SSPP news at the time the study was conducted were Financial Times, The New York 
Times and Euractiv. 
8 Collier, D. 2011. “Understanding Process Tracing”, Political Science and Politics 44 (4), pp. 823-830; Mahoney, J. 
2010. “After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research”, World Politics Vol 62, No.1, pp. 120-147. 
! %!
has been seen by analysts as epitomizing the Russian centrifugal geoeconomic power in the EU’s energy 
policies,9 focusing on the political struggle of 2014. Lastly, some conclusions are drawn. 
 
2. The Rise of Geoeconomics  
There is an emerging body of literature that sees geoeconomics as a rising – or to be more accurate, returning 
– framework of foreign policy analysis.10 The concept of geoeconomics was originally coined for this type of 
policy analysis by strategist and political scientist Edward Luttwak in a seminal essay in 1990.11 Luttwak 
pointedly criticized the optimism surrounding the end of the Cold War, new global interdependence, and its 
beneficial consequences, in which “the logic of conflict itself, which is adversarial, zero-sum, and 
paradoxical”, would be displaced.12 Instead, he envisioned “a much less complete transformation of state 
action” by the emergence of geoeconomics.13 The concept of geoeconomics, invented and put forward by a 
non-economist, kick-started a debate between IR scholars and economists.14 In his review of Luttwak’s book, 
economist Raymond Vernon implied that the underlying idea of geoeconomics was to find status and jobs 
for the “ranks of underemployed geopoliticians” after the Cold War.15 Realist IR scholars, in particular, 
countered that laissez-faire economists are “out in left field […] because they are blind to the fact that 
economic activity is a source of power as well as well-being”.16  
Geoeconomics gained some popularity in Washington in the 1990s, especially during the early years 
of the Clinton administration. According to Thirlwell, this was typically related to the anxiety caused by the 
economic competition from Japan.17 However, economic liberalism gained much more traction in the form 
of globalization, taken here in the narrow sense of the word, consisting of international economic integration 
of markets for goods, services, capital and labor. The cooperative framework of multilateralism also took 
several important steps forward, notably in the fields of regional (NAFTA, ASEAN, EU) and international 
trade (World Trade Organization) and environment (Rio Conventions; Kyoto Protocol). Particularly in 
Europe, the growing interdependence – together with advances in multilateralism and the growing corpus of 
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9 See for example, Jakóbik, W. 2014. “South Stream epitomises Russia’s divisive energy politics in Europe”, available 
at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsee/2014/08/08/south-stream-epitomises-russias-divisive-energy-politics-in-europe/. 
10 Thirlwell, M. The Return of Geoeconomics: Globalisation and National Security (Sydney: The Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, 2010); Kundnani, H. 2011. “Germany as a Geoeconomic Power”, The Washington Quarterly Vol. 
34, No.3, pp. 31-45; Martiningui, A. and Youngs, R. (eds). Challenges for European Foreign Policy in 2012: What kind 
of geo-economic Europe? (Madrid: FRIDE, 2011); Baru, S. Understanding Geo-economics and Strategy (Washington: 
International Institute for Security Studies, 2013); Szabo, S. Germany, Russia, and the Rise of Geoeconomics (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2014). 
11 Luttwak, supra note 4. 
12 Ibid, p. 125. 
13 Ibid, p. 126. 
14 For a good overview, see Thirlwell, supra note 10. 
15 Vernon, R. 1993. “Unclear and Present Danger: Review of ‘The endangered American dream’.” The National 
Interest 34, available at: http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/unclear-and-present-danger-446. 
16 Huntington, S. 1993. “Why International Primacy Matters”, International Security Vol. 17, No 4, p. 72. 
17 Ibid. pp. 68-83. 
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international law – was seen to create a peaceful international environment in the spirit of Pax Mercatoria.18 
The founding assumption of the post-Cold War order in Europe was that economic integration would drive 
closer political cohesion within the EU as well as in its neighborhood.19 It is hard to find an EU foreign 
policy strategy paper that does not include this notion.20 The deepening of interdependency and solidarity 
was also seen as promoting the “European model”, delegating political authority to the supranational sphere 
and redefining power as surveillance in different networks, and thus underpinning the idea that “Europe will 
not run the world as an empire, but the European way of doing things will have become the world’s way”.21 
 As a result of harmonization and globalization of international trade in general, for Russia, similar 
to China, the export revenues have increased,22 and Russia has become a major host for foreign direct 
investment (FDI), following initiatives for better integration in international trade. The Global Investment 
Trend Monitor published by UNCTAD indicates that, for the first time in history, Russia has become the 
third largest recipient of FDI. However, as addressed later in this article, the new geopolitical tensions 
between Russia, Ukraine and the Western countries have reversed this positive trend and, as a consequence, 
FDI fell to a record low in 2014 and 2015.23   
After the “unipolar moment” and the advances in economic liberalism of the 1990s,24 there has been 
a notable and increasing tendency for regional powers to consider the issues of trade and commerce through 
the prisms of national security and foreign policy. Scholars seem to concur, even if they do not use the term 
“geoeconomics”, and analyse world politics under the general banners of “zero-sum world”,25 
“multipolarity”,26 or “multipolar order”.27 Although Bernek has recently opined that “the grand strategies of 
the 21st century geopolitics will be pursued chiefly through economic means”,28 the rise of geoeconomics by 
no means suggests that economic liberalism, rules-based multilateralism with legal treaties, or the geopolitics 
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18 The idea of commerce reducing the likelihood of war dates back to the High Enlightenment and especially the 
writings of Immanuel Kant, who famously noted that “the spirit of commerce, which is incompatible with war, sooner 
or later gains the upper hand in every state”. See Kant, I. 1795 Perpetual Peace (New York: Cosimo, 2005), p. 39. 
19 “‘Fragmentation’ and ‘identity’ are reshaping the world”, Financial Times, 18 December 2014.  
20 For an illustrative example of interdependence idealism, see a keynote speech of former Finnish Foreign Minister Dr 
Erkki Tuomioja in the Finnish Parliament in February 2004:”The European Union and Russia are tied together into a 
knot of positive interdependence. In many public statements our relation is often thus characterised as a ’strategic 
partnership based on common values’. This touches upon something essential: our interaction and increased 
cooperation cannot but benefit us both.” See “Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja: The EU and Russia - upcoming 
challenges of globalisation”, available at: 
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=61044&contentlan=2&culture=en-US.      
21 Leonard, M. Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), p. 245. 
22 In 2014 Russia witnessed a 250-percent increase in capital outflow as compared to 2013. Kuchma A., “Russia is 
facing record capital and investment outflow”, Russia Beyond the Headlines, January 29, 2015. 
http://rbth.co.uk/business/2015/01/29/russia_is_facing_record_capital_and_investment_outflow_43261.html.  
23 https://en.santandertrade.com/establish-overseas/russia/foreign-investment.  
24 Layne, C. 1993. “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”, International Security 17 (4), pp. 5-51. 
25 Rachman, G.  Zero-sum World: Politics, Power and Prosperity After the Crash (London: Atlantic Books, 2010).  
26 Kupchan, C. 1998. “After Pax Americana: benign power, regional integration, and the sources of a stable 
multipolarity”, International Security 23 (2), pp. 40-79 
27 Turner, S. 2009. “Russia, China and a multipolar world order: The danger in the undefined”, Asian Perspective Vol. 
33, No. 1, pp. 159-184 
28 Bernek A., 2015. “The “Grand Chessboard” of the 21st Century Geopolitical Strategies of the Multi-polar World”, 
National Security Review, Special Issue / MMXV. 
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of conventional military power are things of the past. Nor does it claim that geoeconomic conduct is a new 
phenomenon, as there has always been a significant degree of overlap and convergence between these 
various strands of policy areas such as international economics, foreign relations, and security.29 However, 
equally important is the fact that over time significant shifts have occurred both in the relative importance of 
these linkages, and in the attention paid to them.30 The argument simply suggests that geoeconomic conduct 
is gaining in relative importance, and as a result, scholars and analysts are beginning to pay more attention to 
it.  
There are many interrelated reasons for this relative change in world politics and, taken together, 
these factors underpin the current relevance of geoeconomics. The first major factor is the rise of China and 
the subsequent shifts in global economic power.31 Much of the contemporary academic and policy discussion 
in world politics is about the strategic implications of a multipolar world or, more narrowly, about the 
consequences of the economic rise of China. The possible agreement following the transformation has been 
termed by some analysts as the “global grand bargain”.32 The second related issue is the rise of the state 
capitalist model for development. The versions of bureaucratically engineered capitalism33 are particular to 
each government that practices them, with primary working tools including national oil and gas corporations, 
other state-owned enterprises, privately owned national champions, sovereign wealth funds, and state-owned 
banks.34 Thirdly, the financial crisis and the humiliation of the deregulated market system from 2008 
onwards have weakened the liberal argument and highlighted the link between the economy and security. 
The financial crisis has had broad consequences, for example in Europe, where a commonly heard view has 
long been that the EU was “punching below its weight”35 in international affairs due to its preoccupation 
with internal developments. This condition has become more severe in the context of the eurozone crisis. 
Fourthly, the growing focus in international relations on resource scarcity36 highlights security of supply and 
zero-sum thinking. The rapid growth, industrialization and urbanization of Asia’s populous economies have 
temporarily caused high resource prices and the return of neo-Malthusian anxieties. 
The current importance of geoeconomics highlights its differences from and similarities to the 
traditional geopolitical perspective. For instance, the geopolitical direction based on “hard power”, in other 
words, military power and spending, to a great extent depends on economic strength. At the same time, 
countries are reluctant to utilize military force and instead rely on their economic influence for their foreign 
policies and strategies. While this may be achieved on the back of trading valuable commodities or resources 
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29 See for example, Mattlin, M. and Wigell, M. 2015. “Geoeconomics in the Context of Restive Regional Powers”, Asia 
Europe Journal (forthcoming). 
30 Thirwell, supra note 10. 
31 Fenby, J. Will China Dominate the 21st Century? (Cambridge: Polity, 2014) and Mearsheimer, J. 2014. “Can China 
Rise Peacefully?”, The National Interest, 8 April 2014. 
32 Hutchings, R. and Kempe, F. 2008. “The Global Grand Bargain”, Foreign Policy, 5 November 2008. 
33 Also referred to as non-market economies and / or socialist capitalist economies.  
34 Bremmer, I. The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War between States and Corporations? (New 
York: Portfolio, 2010). 
35 Thomas, D. 2012. “Still Punching below Its Weight? Coherence and Effectiveness in European Union Foreign 
Policy”, Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 457-474. 
36 Lee, B. 2013. The Geopolitics of the Modern Resource Boom. Americas Quarterly Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 44-50. 
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(i.e. oil and gas), it can also be achieved by direct participation in the state’s financial system via trade in 
services and investment – for example, Russia’s largest commercial bank, Sberbank, has become a major 
player not only in EU Member State economies such as Austria and Hungary, but also in the EU more 
generally since 2012.37 Accordingly, geoeconomic strategies and realities include employment of various 
trade mechanisms and in turn underpin the realisation of political influence and foreign policy objectives. 
 
3. Geoeconomics in the EU-Russia Natural Gas Trade 
Under Vladimir Putin’s reign, a “fundamental reference point for Russia’s economic ideology is national 
security”.38 In this view, liberal ideologies are seen as enemies of Russia’s “nationally minded economy” – 
the success of which should be measured against the ability to ensure Russia’s national interests, not against 
the “false benchmarks of economic liberalism”.39 For Russia, this geoeconomic modus operandi almost 
inevitably involves natural gas.40 Russia is among the world’s biggest energy exporters, but without the sale 
of its energy products, the value of Russian exports is smaller than that of Poland’s.41  
Luttwak has already noted that the propensity of states to act geoeconomically will vary 
greatly, even more than their propensity to act geopolitically.42 Geoeconomic activity is contextual, and 
limited and enabled by two broad factors: political ideology and state-private sector interactions.43 Firstly, in 
the field of political ideology, some states resist acting geoeconomically for institutional, doctrinal and 
political reasons, especially if they are deeply committed to moral politics or a laissez-faire attitude.44 A 
political struggle takes place in the domestic sphere of different countries in varied political contexts, in 
which some constituencies demand geoeconomic activism from the state, and some argue against it. On the 
other hand, as discussed later in this article, traditional geopolitical conduct such as a conventional military 
power projection will also limit the possibilities of geoeconomic strategies.  
Secondly, an equally important variable is the nature of the coexistence of state and private 
economic operators. Their coexistence can be passive, for example in the case of a large group of small, 
localized service businesses. In the energy sector, the relationship is typically different, as manifested by the 
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37 Sberbank has acquired ownership of the Austrian Volksbank International, which is an important bank in a number of 
EU Member States. In addition, Sberbank and Cetelem, the consumer lending division of the BNP Paribas Group, and 
the leading provider of consumer loans in France and Europe, have signed on 26 December 2011 a binding partnership 
agreement to create a joint venture for a Russian POS in which the 70% majority stake is held by Sberbank. 
http://www.bnpparibas.com/en/news/press-release/sberbank-leading-russian-bank-and-cetelem-europes-leading-
consumer-credit-player-; see also http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/20e926f2-b19c-11e2-9315-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3mU55L0Do.  
38 Yakunin, V. I., Bagdasaryan, V. E. and  Sulakshin, S. S. Economic Policy Ideology (Moscow: Governance and 
Problem Analysis Centre, 2009), pp. 226–231 
39 Ibid. 
40 If gas production remains at the current levels, Russia’s current (discovered) gas reserves have been predicted to last 
more than 50 years. Paltsev S., 2014. “Scenarios for Russia's natural gas exports to 2050”, Energy Economics, Vol. 42, 
pp. 262-170.  
41 For comparisons and illustrations, see The Atlas of Economic Complexity by the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, available at: https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/rus/. 
42 Luttwak, supra note 4, p. 128. 
43 Luttwak, supra note 4, pp. 128-130. 
44 Szabo, supra note 10. 
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case of Russia and its energy giant, Gazprom. In the words of Luttwak, there is an intense positive 
interaction “between politically weighty businesses in need of state support on the world economic scene”, 
or conversely, the state “seeking to guide large companies for their own geoeconomic purposes, or even 
select[ing] them as their chosen instrument”.45 In the Russian context, Yakunin et al. draw examples of 
success from the close inter-linkages between the state and business in the military, nuclear, oil and gas 
industries.46 Gazprom holds a legal monopoly in natural gas exports and is directly under the control of the 
Kremlin. Russia’s energy strategy has been analyzed in terms of a “symbiotic relationship” between the state 
and leading companies.47 As noted by Luttwak, in the geoeconomic game “the state can be both user and 
used, and companies both instruments and instrumentalizers”.48 However, in spite of the rather clear control 
relationship, it is worth pointing out that Gazprom (as a company) and the Kremlin (as Putin’s power 
vertical) may also have diverging interests. Russian interest is not a monolith, and while Gazprom benefits 
from its privileged position, it is also restricted by political gas pricing both domestically and internationally, 
as well as geoeconomically-motivated hardline policies, such as the Ukrainian Gas Crisis in 2009. According 
to analysts, the critical and, for Gazprom, extremely costly decision to turn off the gas was likely made by 
then-Prime Minister Putin.49 In February 2010, as Russia was again able to count on a sympathetic 
government in Kiev, the price of gas was cut by almost 30 per cent, and Russia gained a new 30-year 
contract for Sevastopol.50 The price cut was so large that the Russian government financed it to Gazprom 
directly.51 The 2009 gas crisis, as well as the current military operations in Ukraine, indicate rather clearly 
that Gazprom’s commercial interest is overrun by Kremlin power politics. 
 
3.1 Russia’s natural gas policy turns to geoeconomics 
There is little question that, in the 1990s, the EU and Russia were closely aligned with regard to the main 
features of the European energy order. The early years after the Cold War saw the birth of the European 
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45 Luttwak, supra note 4, p. 129. 
46 Yakunin et al., supra note 38. 
47 Bilgin, M. 2011. “Energy Security and Russia’s Gas Strategy: The symbiotic relationship between the state and 
firms”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 119-127. Gazprom has also been described as a 
company serving two masters: it issues shares to outside investors, therefore it should, at least in theory, aim to 
maximise profits in the long run. However, because it is majority-owned by the Russian state, it pursues political and 
foreign policy goals. Economically, the company is run inefficiently: The Peterson Institute for International Economics 
reported that although Gazprom posted nominal profits of $46 billion in 2011, it lost $40 billion to “corruption and 
inefficiency”. See The Economist, Russia’s wounded giant, 23 March 2013, 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21573975-worlds-biggest-gas-producer-ailing-it-should-be-broken-up-
russias-wounded-giant.  
48 Luttwak, supra note 4. 
49 Pirani, S., Stern J and Yafimava, K. 2009. “The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive 
assessment”, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, available at: http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2010/11/NG27-TheRussoUkrainianGasDisputeofJanuary2009AComprehensiveAssessment-
JonathanSternSimonPiraniKatjaYafimava-2009.pdf. 
50 Pirani, S., Stern J and Yafimava, K. 2010. “The April 2010 Russo-Ukrainian gas agreement and its implications for 




Energy Community in 1990,52 the European Energy Charter in 1991,53 the Energy Charter Treaty in 1994,54 
and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 1994.55 The agenda was to achieve a system functioning 
under open market principles and the rule of law, based on Western norms and standards, across the wider 
European energy market, “encompassing production countries from the Atlantic to Vladivostok”.56 The non-
energy-related function of these governance arrangements was to contribute to overall European stability by 
spurring integration, contributing to the development of the single market as well as exporting legal norms to 
Eastern Europe.57  
The initial optimistic agenda informed by the rule of law ran into obvious difficulties as Russia 
gradually hardened its stance. The emerging Russian position was a profoundly geoeconomic one, based on 
bilateral, state-centric and sovereignty-bound practices. Many scholars have analyzed Russia’s policies, in 
which it uses the control over energy streams to Europe as a means to enhance its foreign policy influence 
and regional power status.58 The same stance can be also seen in key Russian policy documents, such as the 
Energy Strategy for 2020, which already in 2003 noted explicitly that energy resources constitute an 
instrument of the internal and external policies of Russia,59 as well as the latest Energy Strategy of 2009, 
which states that “[t]he aim of Russia's energy policy is the most efficient use of natural energy resources 
and sustainable economic growth, improving the quality of life of the population and to promote foreign 
policy positions”.60 This is a clear indication that Russia sees its energy resources and companies as 
instruments of political influence, not merely as economic operators.  
In April 2004, the Energy Charter Treaty signed during the Yeltsin presidency was removed from 
the State Duma agenda for “flatly contradicting the national interests of Russia” and for “being imposed on 
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52 See Energy Community webpages, available at: https://www.energy-
community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/ENERGY_COMMUNITY. 
53 For background, see European Energy Charter, available at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/energy/external_dimension_enlargement/l27028_en.htm . 
54 Ibid. 
55 See Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), available at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/eastern_europe_and_central_a
sia/r17002_en.htm. 
56 Haukkala, supra note 1.  
57 Axelrod, R. S. 1996. “The European Energy Charter Treaty: Reality or Illusion?” Energy Policy Vol. 24, No. 6, pp. 
497–505. 
58 Legvold, R. (ed.) Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century & the Shadow of the Past (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007); Goldman, M. I.  Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008); Finon, D. and Locatelli, C. 2008. “Russian and European gas interdependence: Could 
contractual trade channel geopolitics?”, Energy Policy 36 (1), pp. 423–442; P. Aalto (ed.) The EU–Russian Energy 
Dialogue: Europe’s Future Energy Security (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009); Perovic, J., Orttung, R. W. and Wenger, A. 
(eds) Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations: Implications for Conflict and Cooperation  (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2009); Nowak, B. 2010. “Forging the External Dimension of the Energy Policy of the European Union”, 
The Electricity Journal 23 (1), pp. 57–66; Liuhto, supra note 6; Haukkala, supra note 1; Dizdarevic, supra note 1. 
59 Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation. 2003. The Summary of the Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period of 
up to 2020. Available at http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030_(Eng).pdf. 
60 Direct quotation is as follows: “!"#$% &'"()"*+,"-./0 1/#+*+.+ 2/--++ 34#3"*-3 56.-+56#$'/ &77".*+4'/" 
+-1/#$8/46'+" 1(+(/9':; &'"()"*+,"-.+; ("-<(-/4 + 1/*"'=+6#6 &'"()"*+,"-./)/ -".*/(6 9#3 <-*/0,+4/)/ 
(/-*6 &./'/5+.+, 1/4:>"'+3 .6,"-*46 ?+8'+ '6-"#"'+3 -*(6': + -/9"0-*4+3 <.("1#"'+% "" 
4'">'"&./'/5+,"-.+; 1/8+=+0”, available at: http://minenergo.gov.ru/activity/energostrategy/ch_1.php. 
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Russia from the outside”.61 It is crucial to note that the negotiations over energy trade in the 2000s were not 
only of a legal and technical nature, with rational positions stemming from security of supply versus security 
of demand, and different expectations concerning proper prices and contracting. The negotiations had 
undertones of great-power politics, including the politicized “energy weapon” threatening the EU and, on the 
other side, the EU scheming and employing political double standards to “punish” the growing Russian 
economy and power. In 2009 Russia formally withdrew from the Energy Charter Treaty,62 stating that the 
key reason was third-party access enabled by the regime, which would allow former Soviet countries to 
access infrastructure dominated by Russian companies. It is not legally certain whether the Energy Charter 
Treaty would actually do this, but Russia decided to frame the issue of leaving the Treaty in this manner.63 A 
number of analysts observed that “eventually the discussion [around the ECT] moved to a virtual space, in 
which some non-existent provisions of the ECT were hotly debated […]. This ‘virtual background’ created 
the informational background for Russia’s adoption of the decision to withdraw from the ECT.”64 
Furthermore, Russia enacted two federal statutes, which were aimed at restricting access for foreign 
investors and non-state-controlled Russian energy companies to the upstream oil and gas markets in Russia.65  
Frustrated by the lack of success with the treaty-based approach, the EU has continued to pursue the 
dialogue on energy under the auspices of the bilateral Energy Dialogue since 2000,66 and the EU-Russia 
Energy Roadmap since 2011.67 In the meantime, the EU set off to create a fully integrated regulatory regime 
for its internal energy market via a number of legal instruments68 whilst continuing its efforts to materialize a 
multilateral energy trade regime.69 Russia’s withdrawal and call for an alternative framework seemingly 
acted as a catalyst for the modernization process of the Energy Charter and even served the initiative of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Haukkala, supra note 1, p. 9. 
62 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin issued a decree on 30 July 2009 declaring Russia’s rejection of the Energy 
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68 The EU internal energy market is regulated under the Third Energy Package which consists of two Directives and 
three Regulations: Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing 
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Cooperation of Energy Regulators. 
69 Op. cit. International Energy Charter 2015.  
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EU to create a multilateral energy trading regime. Notably, when the first step of this modernization was 
completed, the ensuing political declaration, the International Energy Charter, was endorsed (with a number 
of new countries coming on board, including China).  
Figure 1 provides a snapshot overview of Gazprom’s natural gas pricing as a centrifugal force within 
the EU. The prices are negotiated on a country-by-country basis and attached to fluctuate with world oil 
prices according to a formula. The export prices and quantities were made public for the first time in 2013 
pursuant to a new EU regulation.70 By comparing, for example, the prices paid for 1000 cubic meters of gas 
by Hungary ($391) and Poland ($526), or Romania ($431) and Bulgaria ($501), it becomes clear that the 
differences cannot be explained by transportation distance or gas quantity. Instead, they are shaped by 
competition vs. degree of dependency, bilateral negotiations, and political discounts.  
 
 
Figure 1. European natural gas prices and quantities imported from Russia in 2012.71  
 
Russia has used gas exports as a carrot, on the one hand, giving discounts especially to sympathetic 
governments in the former Soviet countries and to “strategic partners” in Western Europe, and, on the other 
hand, as a stick, giving “hard” contracts to the most dependent states with unsympathetic governments. 
Indeed, the variation in gas prices (and contracts) between different customers in the EU cannot be explained 
on commercial grounds (Figure 1).72 Here, the gas trade emerges as a “wedge strategy” in which gas 
discounts and renegotiated ‘secret’ agreements act as an incentive against the EU’s unity and solidarity. For 
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70 Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 concerning 
measures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC. 
71 The data for the illustration is drawn from the EU Commission via Dizdarevic, supra note 1. 
72 Stegen, S. K. 2011. “Deconstructing the ‘energy weapon’: Russia’s threat to Europe as case study”, Energy Policy, 
Vol. 39, No. 10, pp. 6505–6513. 
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instance, Gazprom has given favorable and flexible contracts to its German partners ($379.3 per 1000 cubic 
meters, see Figure 1) such as E.ON and chemical giant BASF,73 companies that also hold sizeable shares in 
Yuzhno-Russkoye gas fields.74 Russia’s incentive-oriented gas policies have encouraged German politicians 
not to pursue EU unity and collective action on the energy front.75 While German ex-chancellor Schröder 
joined the board of Gazprom and backed the Russian action in Ukraine,76 chancellor Merkel led the effort to 
block the proposed EU regulations to limit the ability of foreign companies to buy European energy utilities 
– a measure aimed at addressing Gazprom’s monopolistic position in the EU gas markets.77 Russia, in turn, 
sees its relationship with Germany as a valuable asset for asserting greater influence in European affairs.78 
Similar energy geoeconomics is focused on many other actors and states as well. For example, many 
important current and former national energy champions – in small and large EU Member States alike – have 
close ties with the Russian energy sector. The leading French electricity group, EDF, has joint ventures with 
Gazprom, while GDF (now Engie) and Total are closely linked to various Russian companies. Likewise, 
Italy’s ENI is a founding partner of the controversial South Stream pipeline project (addressed below).  
The EU political institutions, the Council,79 the Parliament80 and the Commission, have 
repeatedly taken a stand on a “common foreign energy policy strategy” that goes beyond the single market, 
underscoring the need for a strategic foreign policy approach in energy relations.81 Several Member States 
have joined the position. Poland, for example, with an unfavorable gas contract ($525.5 per 1000 cubic 
meters, see Figure 1) and several other disputes with Russia, has lobbied hard for “energy solidarity” and the 
Europeanisation of energy security since the 2006 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis.82 However, while the EU 
institutions, the Commission in particular, have been keen to underscore a more unified policy in external 
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energy relations,83 this stance has long been countered by Russian energy geoeconomics and the Member 
States’ bilateral energy agreements with Russia. Even the simplest transparency and coordination measures 
have been challenging for the EU’s external energy policy to achieve. For example, the first time Gazprom’s 
gas prices were available to public was in 2013 thanks to a new EU regulation,84 as Gazprom had long 
insisted that gas pricing agreements should be kept confidential.85 
Furthermore, the most extreme measure of energy-related geoeconomic power, cutting the 
energy supplies for political reasons, became characteristic of Russian conduct after a long period of reliable 
deliveries. In the late 2000s, Russia was entangled in disputes with several countries over energy, which led 
to political cut-offs. For example, Russia cut off gas to the Czech Republic when it supported the US missile 
defense plan in 2008.86 The most severe disruptions  were the 2006 gas dispute with Ukraine, the explosion 
of the Turkmenistan-Russia pipeline in 2009, the 2006 and 2010 oil disputes with Belarus, and the second 
Ukrainian gas crisis in 2008/2009, which led to the severing of most of the supplies to Central and South 
East Europe. A prime example of the difficulties some EU countries faced was the situation in Bulgaria’s 
biggest fertilizer plant, which received a fax at 4.30 am on 6 January 2009 warning that their gas supply was 
going to be cut off immediately.87 An instant shutdown could have destroyed vital capital, such as the plant’s 
pipes.88 At the time of the empirical case analyzed in this paper, the push for South Stream in 2014, the gas 
supplies to Ukraine were cut off again, this time as a consequence of the conventional warfare in Eastern 
Ukraine.89  
 
2.2 EU struggles to create an internal market for gas 
As Russia began to increase its assertiveness and turn to geoeconomic means in its natural gas policy, the EU 
focused on developing a competitive single market for gas, especially after the failure of the broader 
multilateral treaty approach that included partner countries became evident. This strategy is partly to control 
Russian geoeconomic influence, expressed in terms of concern over energy security in various EU 
documents. The EU approach to energy law has been informed by its competition law principles and based 
on non-discriminative third-party access, the unbundling of production and transport of energy, and 
regulatory oversight by a public authority.90 In doing so, the EU has aimed to strengthen the negotiating 
position of Member States, ensuring security of supply, proper functioning of the internal market and 
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creating legal certainty for investment.91 Furthermore, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy (HR) was invited to take full account of the energy security dimension in her work.92 
The policy developments and state practices indicate that the EU wants to ‘create a negotiated framework 
based on the principle of “equal market conditions” while state controlled Russian companies are pursuing 
“equal benefits to their partners in any transaction”.93! 
The European natural gas market used to be based on monopolies, either de jure or de facto, 
and constrained by state boundaries.94 The regulatory framework was country-based and national champions 
were protected from outside competition. The price of gas used to depend – and still does to a considerable 
degree – on long-term, take-or-pay contracts that are indexed with competing fuel prices, typically oil 
products. The motivation for long-term, oil-indexed take-or-pay contracts is to address the high investment 
costs of gas transportation and the energy security concerns of the supplier, of which Gazprom is the most 
significant (Figure 2). The duration of long-term contracts is typically 20 to 25 years. In a take-or-pay 




91 European Council, Conclusions on Energy, 04 February 2011, (EUCO 2/1/11 Rev 1, 8 March 2011).  
92 Ibid. HR is the chief co-ordinator and representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within the 
European Union. 
93 Oxenstierna, S. and Tynkkynen, V-P.  Russian Energy and Security up to 2030 (London, Routledge, 2014) p. 91.  
94 For a detailed analysis of the EU energy law and regulation see, Talus K. EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical 




Figure 2. The share of natural gas, natural gas from Gazprom, and natural gas from Gazprom 
via Ukraine for EU Member States.95 
 
Another important prerequisite of the market, namely the necessary connecting infrastructure, has been slow 
to materialize. The EU Commission has made regulatory efforts to overcome this state of affairs, through 
several directives that have been complemented by decrees and regulations. A notable regulatory milestone 
was the Third Energy Package proposed by the Commission in 2007 and which entered into force in 2009. 
The on-the-ground progress towards the EU goals has been slow due to several factors, including reluctant 
Member States, the political clout of the national champions, the market structure and long distances, and 
failures in regulation.96  
However, the EU efforts to limit the role of take-or-pay contracts and liberation of parts of the 
network capacity paved the way for the events of 2010, when competition in the EU natural gas markets 
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finally took forward steps. This development materialized as high oil prices and the shale gas boom in North 
America coincided, with the former pushing long-term gas prices up and the latter leaving an LNG surplus 
on the world market and bringing relatively cheap LNG to European ports.97 Since then, spot-priced gas has 
continuously increased its share particularly in Western Europe,98 but crucially, eastern parts of the Union 
are notably lagging behind in the competition (see Figure 2). It is worth noting that for several EU Member 
States the ideological shift has been hard – and the geoeconomic motivation of national energy champions 
and governments to “defend turf” against competition from other Member States has been at play. The 
interaction between the state and national energy champions is still intimate and takes many forms within the 
EU countries. It was only in July 2015 that 15 EU and Energy Community countries in the Central Eastern 
Europe and South East European regions reached a general agreement to work together to accelerate the 
building of missing gas infrastructure links and to tackle the remaining technical and regulatory issues which 
hamper the development of an integrated energy market in the region.99 
 
4. Geoeconomics in action: the South Stream Pipeline Project 
 
The SSPP aimed at bringing about the capacity to ship 63 billion cubic meters of Gazprom’s gas annually 
across the Black Sea to the Balkans and finally to Austria and Italy (Figure 3). The project was announced in 
June 2007 and a Memorandum of Understanding signed by Gazprom and Italian Eni in November 2007.100 
In September 2012 a consortium was formed in which Gazprom owns 50 percent, Eni has 20 percent, 
and French EDF and German Wintershall each own 15 percent of the offshore section.101 The pipeline 
ownership in each transit country would be divided between Gazprom and a national partner with an equal 
split. According to the plans, 30 percent of the financing would be paid by the shareholders and 70 percent 
would come from credit financing.102  
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Figure 3. Projected South Stream pipeline route options.103 
 
From the outset, the mainstream perception of analysts has been that the project is motivated by 
geoeconomics – a strategic advantage rather than commercial viability. With no growth expected in the 
European gas market,104 and Gazprom having to bear a large part of the building costs, estimated at $40 
billion,105 or even @50 billion according to another estimate,106 the business case for implementing the South 
Stream plan was “always weak”.107 The EU’s demand for gas has declined owing to weak economic 
performance since 2008, cheap coal enabled by America’s shale gas boom since 2010, and the expansion of 
renewable energies, especially since 2010. As summarized by a prominent analyst, “South Stream is a very 
expensive landline to markets that may not be all that lucrative”.108  
As the weak projected commercial profitability suggests, the motivation for South Stream was 
instead based on geoeconomic advantages and enhancement of Russia’s sphere of influence. Firstly, Russia 
could increase its leverage over Ukraine, depriving the country of gas transit revenue and its key lever in 
Moscow as a transit state between Russia and the EU markets.109 With the SSPP, Gazprom would acquire an 
alternative route to many customers in Europe which can currently only be accessed via Ukraine. This would 
leave Ukraine exposed to price increases and cut-offs, as Gazprom could switch off supplies without 
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inconveniencing other European clients.110 Russia has strongly championed SSPP since the Ukraine-Russia 
gas crisis in 2006 and 2009, as circumventing Ukraine and gaining the upper hand in the troublesome transit 
relations had gained political weight, and the attempts to negotiate partial or full ownership of the Ukrainian 
gas pipe network had failed. Several analysts see South Stream in this context as a “Plan B” for Russia, as 
the initiatives to form a consortium to manage the Ukrainian network had not produced similar results as 
with Belarus, in which Gazprom eventually was able to acquire 100 percent of Beltransgaz’s shares in 
2011.111  
Secondly, Russia stood to re-increase its influence in South-Eastern Europe, weakening the region’s 
alliance with the EU. This would take place by increasing the market share and the countries’ dependency on 
the Gazprom pipeline gas as a consequence. With SSPP, or so the geoeconomic reasoning goes, Russia could 
solidify its political influence within the countries on the projected route, especially among the small 
economies that have troublesome relations with the wider EU, such as Hungary and Greece, as well as the 
centuries-old ally, Serbia.112 To a lesser extent, further influence could be exerted on big-market final 
destinations Italy and Austria, politically sympathetic energy-importers which have adopted less 
inflammatory language among EU countries on Russia’s geopolitical campaign in Ukraine.113  
Thirdly, the project has effectively prevented competing plans to transport gas from Azerbaijan 
through Turkey into the EU market.114 Another large gas supplier would increase competition in South-
Eastern Europe – a long-lasting strategic priority of Brussels115 – and the primary candidate has been the 
Shah Deniz gas field in the waters of Azerbaijan, potentially coupled with production from the Middle 
East.116 Several such pipeline project plans have been competing with one another under the blueprint of the 
EU-backed “Southern Gas Corridor”.117 Indeed, the plan to build SSPP originally surfaced in 2007 when the 
EU, alarmed by the first Ukrainian gas crisis, was launching negotiations for a competing pipeline.118  
A particular political and legal struggle in the geoeconomics between the EU and Russia was not 
only whether to build the SSPP, but on whose terms the pipeline would function. This question became 
politicized in the context of the bilateral agreements negotiated and signed by Russia and European partner 
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countries on the projected pipeline route between 2008 and 2011. These intergovernmental agreements were 
made with EU Member States Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary and Slovenia, as well as Serbia, 
which is currently negotiating for its accession to the EU.119 A Memorandum of Understanding was also 
signed with Republika Srpska, the ethnically Serb part of Bosnia.120 Similarly, Gazprom signed bilateral 
agreements on cooperation with the authorized national partners and set up joint project companies in each 
transit country, usually owned to 50 percent by both parties.121 The signing of the agreements was typically 
complemented with a new gas contract, such as the one which Bulgarian PM Boyko Borisov and Gazprom 
CEO Alexei Miller announced simultaneously with their SSPP bilateral agreement in 2012, giving Bulgaria a 
20 percent price cut for the next 10 years.122 In 2013 Gazprom hosted official welding ceremonies in 
Bulgaria and Serbia,123 as well as a signing ceremony in Hungary.124 These events were interpreted as 
geoeconomic showcases for Russia’s seriousness regarding the project – the timing of the events suggests 
that a geoeconomic motivation to impress Ukraine to opt for Russia’s Customs Union was likely present.125 
For the EU Commission, the project was still in a rather early planning phase, as Gazprom has not officially 
presented the precise route of the pipeline.126 
In short, the SSPP agreements represent the traditional energy order and would require notable 
exemptions, as they contain provisions that breach the relevant energy and competition legislation of the 
EU.127 The former includes the rules aimed at creating the EU-wide internal market in natural gas, and the 
latter includes the competition rules that aim to prevent the abuse of a dominant position, and enforce 
antitrust proceedings. Under the current EU legislation, gas transport system operators must build gas 
interconnectors in accordance with the regulated third-party access principle.128 National authorities may 
request exemptions from the third-party access rules. The national regulatory authority must assess the 
request for exemption submitted by an operator, and the national regulator’s decision then needs 
Commission approval. The Commission’s opinion is binding. For infrastructure projects that affect several 
EU countries, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) may coordinate the different 
requests. The Commission and ACER only exceptionally grant exemptions from third-party access or the 
implementation of provisions on unbundling. Officially, these exemptions are granted on the basis of criteria, 
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which emphasize, for example, that the investment “must improve security of supply and boost competition 
in the gas market”.129 However, in practice, the decision to grant exemptions is notably political. As noted by 
an analyst, under the conditions of the Ukraine crisis and the ensuing economic sanctions and counter-
sanctions, the Commission was “in no mood to grant Gazprom further exemptions”.130 Complying with EU 
legislation would add costs for the builder, for example by adding extra capacity to the pipeline.131 More 
importantly, in geoeconomic terms, the application of relevant EU legislation would have markedly hindered 
Russia’s ability to use SSPP as a political tool, and was thus unacceptable for the Kremlin.  
The EU Commission took action on the bilateral agreements on the SSPP as it was moving forward, 
and the matter was becoming increasingly political. In September 2012, the Commission announced 
investigations into the agreements, and shortly afterwards started to officially facilitate coordination among 
relevant Member States to investigate in detail how their bilateral agreements complied with EU energy 
market rules, competition law, public procurement rules, and environmental regulation. In December 2013, 
an account was duly published on the breaches of EU legislation found in the agreements.132 As expected, the 
agreements raised concerns over the central issues of the internal energy market rules concerning ownership 
unbundling and blocking the access of third parties. The Commission also identified a tax regime that was 
most favorable to Gazprom and its partners (against the EU’s state aid rules), countries’ subcontracting and 
giving preferential treatment to their companies (against the EU’s rules on protection of competition), and 
companies establishing tariffs for pipeline usage by themselves (against the EU’s internal energy market 
rules).133 From a political perspective, the major issues concerned unbundling, third-party access and tariff 
structure,134 as these have direct consequences for the geoeconomic power in the natural gas trade. 
Early in 2014, Gazprom “was on the brink of winning exemption” to the competition rules to supply 
extra gas to Germany, and this was interpreted by some as a sign that the Commission could also be flexible 
on the SSPP.135 However, the Commission hardened its stance from concerns into outright opposition in late 
March and suspended the negotiations on exemptions, as the Ukraine crisis had evolved into warfare with 
mounting evidence of Russian military involvement. The Commission stated that “decisions on exemptions 
[for South Stream] from the third energy package are on ice for political reasons”.136 In the meantime, the 
European Parliament took the view in an informal resolution that “the South Stream pipeline should not be 
built, and that other sources of supply should be made available”.137  
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However, a rather common perception even after the onset of the Ukraine crisis was that a political 
and legal compromise would be reached, and that the SSPP could eventually move forward. Despite legal 
and political uncertainty, it was anticipated that the SSPP’s momentum would be hard to reverse, especially 
according to industry analysts and company executives.138 Most importantly, the Russian leadership 
calculated that Commission and Parliament actions in March could not “stop a moving train”, and pushed for 
the construction with increased political and economic efforts.  
After the political setbacks and hearing the possibility of legal proceedings in Brussels in March, 
Russia reacted to the hardened EU stance by redoubling its own geoeconomic efforts. With the depth of 
Europe’s commercial ties to Russia and the conflicted loyalties of Member States, Gazprom signed a 
preliminary deal with the energy company OMV in May to extend the SSPP into Austria.139 At the same 
time, Gazprom also announced deals with Switzerland’s Allseas Group, and Italy’s Saipem to build SSPP’s 
underwater pipelines in the Black Sea.140 President Putin visited Austria in June to gain support for the 
project.141  
During her visit to Moscow in July, Italian foreign minister Federica Mogherini and Russian foreign 
minister Sergei Lavrov stated in a press conference that Italy and Russia “confirm our goal on completing the 
construction project of the South Stream gas pipeline ... and to continue active work in order to remove all 
issues that may arise, including in regard to the dialogue with the European Commission”.142 Evidence of 
Hungarian loyalty to the Kremlin was seen in September 2014 when Hungary cut off the reverse gas flows 
from the EU to Ukraine, only days after Gazprom CEO Miller had visited the country.143 President Putin also 
travelled to Italy and Serbia in October to support then EU President Italy’s and Serbia’s stance on the SSPP, 
stressing the continuation of business relations in spite of the Ukraine crisis and “reducing transit gas risk” 
with South Stream.144 Hungary confirmed its unconditional support for the SSPP in November, passing an 
amendment to the procurement rules for pipelines, designed to forestall legal objections from Brussels to the 
construction of the SSPP.145 
In June, the EU Commission launched a legal investigation in Bulgaria,146 and stated in its annual 
enlargement report that Serbia’s accession process would suffer if the project moved forward before the 
agreement with Russia was aligned with the EU’s acquis communautaire.147 In September, the European 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138 See for example, “A Conduit for Russian Gas, Tangled in Europe’s Conflicts”, The New York Times, 1 July 2014. 
139 “South Stream project may now be a pipe dream”, Financial Times, 24 August 2014. 
140 Ibid. 
141 “Austria defies US, EU over South Stream during Putin visit”, Deutsche Welle, 25 June 2014. 
142 “Italian EU presidency backs South Stream”, EU Observer, 10 July 2014. 
143 “Hungary suspends gas supplies to Ukraine under pressure from Moscow”, The Guardian, 26 September 2014. 
144 “Putin Pushes South Stream in Belgrade, Milan”, New Europe, 14 October 2014.  
145 “Hungary paves way for Gazprom pipeline”, Financial Times, 5 November 2014. 
146 “EU Commission Reiterates Calls on Bulgaria to Stop South Stream”, Sofia News Agency, 3 June 2014.   
147 “EU puts pressure on Serbia to stop South Stream gas pipeline”, EU Observer, 7 October 2014. 
! #"!
Parliament passed a resolution calling on Member States to cancel the planned energy sector agreements 
with Russia, including the SSPP.148 
The status of the project was confusing, not only legally and politically, but at the ground level of the 
construction work as well. Here, Bulgaria emerged as the main field of SSPP geoeconomics. The other 
possible transit country, Romania, has its own gas reserves and is considered a lost-cause politically by 
Russia, whereas the next countries on the transit route, Serbia and Hungary, could always be counted on to 
support the project.149 SSPP construction and the alleged corruption involved in the Bulgarian contracts were 
among the main election themes in the country in the summer of 2014. According to press reports, there was 
“a secret meeting between Bulgarian Prime Minister and the head of Gazprom”, after which the pipeline 
contracts were given to “a company controlled by a member of Mr. Putin’s inner circle [Gennady 
Timchenko] and politically connected Bulgarian companies”.150 According to the European Council on 
Foreign Relations, the projected price of SSPP in Bulgaria, @7 million per kilometer, was more than twice 
what a similar pipeline construction would cost in Germany.151 The difference between the prices was 
interpreted as a “sophisticated type of corruption” that would, through subcontractors, hugely benefit 
different political actors in Bulgaria – and that “same mechanism would work in Serbia as well”.152 As late 
as August 2014, Gazprom shipped pipes to Varna harbor in Bulgaria and worked on the construction,153 in 
spite of Bulgarian PM Plamen Oresharski promptly denying that there was ongoing construction work,154 and 
the forthcoming PM Boyko Borisov underscoring the need for EU approval before launching any work on 
the pipeline.155 In September, Gazprom announced that construction work on the Serbian stretch would start 
soon.156 The new coalition government elected in Bulgaria in October was regarded as leaning more towards 
Brussels than the preceding Socialist government, and Borisov again officially emphasized that an agreement 
between Brussels and the Kremlin would be needed before construction could proceed.157 
On 1 December 2014, in a surprise turn of events to many, President Putin announced that Russia 
would abandon the project.158 Among the surprised were the closest European partners such as Saipem, the 
contracting subsidiary of Italian energy company ENI, noting that it had not received any formal notification 
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that the project had been scrapped.159 Most contractors and partners did not respond to requests for 
comment,160 indicating confusion after an apparently sudden and unilateral decision by President Putin. In 
his remarks, President Putin framed the demise of SSPP as a loss to Europe and named the then Commission 
as the main culprit, “depriving Bulgaria of the possibility of behaving like a sovereign state”.161 Gazprom’s 
stock rose slightly after the news broke, indicating that the profitability concerns were widely shared among 
its investors.162 SSPP’s geoeconomic motivation was thus verified by the marketplace. The stocks of 
European contractors expected to be involved in the construction dropped sharply,163 highlighting that the 
decision to abandon South Stream indeed came as a surprise to analysts, and had not been anticipated by the 
markets.  
In January 2015, Gazprom notified the EU Commission’s Vice-President that within a few years, 
Gazprom would stop delivering to the EU via Ukraine, and would only make an amount of gas available at 
the Greek-Turkish border. CEO Miller was quoted as saying that as “South Stream is dead”, there will be 
“no other gas transit options than the new Turkish Stream pipeline”.164 According to Miller, it is up to the 
European partners to “put in place the necessary infrastructure”.165 However, it is difficult to estimate 
whether Miller’s words were aimed at impressing domestic audiences, or at actually launching new 
negotiations with foreign partners. The announcement of the $12 billion Turkish Stream reinforced Russia's 
reputation as an unreliable trading partner.166  
For now, the Turkish Stream project is not much more than a blueprint. Both parties have 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding, and will perhaps negotiate the prices and quantities in due 
course.167 Market analysts have expressed doubt about the prospects of gas exports to the EU via Turkey, 
which would require substantial investment in new infrastructure in South-eastern Europe by many of the 
same countries that are still smarting over the demise of the SSPP.168 Turkey’s own gas market is growing, 
but not nearly fast enough to accommodate gas imports on a scale comparable to those the SSPP was 
intended to mobilize.169 However, as the SSPP case has revealed, large-scale pipeline projects are turbulent 
and prone to political uncertainty:  Even while the actual pipes are being transported around the region, the 
project may be called off. The downing of a Russian Su-24 warplane by the Turkish armed forces 
illustratively captures the geopolitical antagonism between Turkey and Russia in Syria,170 which has caused 
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Russia to at least temporarily freeze the Turkish Stream project.171 The geopolitics in Syria may also have 
broader consequences in the energy relations of the two aspiring regional powers.  
Meanwhile, in 2014, as the battle over SSPP intensified, Russia finally began to make progress in its 
efforts to diversify its markets for natural gas. It signed two agreements with China to supply 30bn cubic 
meters of pipeline gas annually – once the projected Power of Siberian pipelines connecting Krasnoyarsk, 
Irkutsk and Yakutia production centers to the Chinese border has been built, optimistically within four to five 
years.172 While this long-term project is a breakthrough in Russian-Chinese energy trade and investment, the 
envisaged supply of 38bn cubic meters of gas (in 2018) to China is only a fourth of the volume of gas Russia 
exported to Europe in 2013 alone,173 and the gas supplies destined for China will not exploit the same energy 
deposits used for Europe. Secondly, the current economic environment in Russia, with its unprecedented 
economic downturn since the 1990s, low oil prices, serious weakening of its currency,174 and problems of 
access to capital due to economic sanctions,175 poses difficulties for several future large-scale investments. 
According to the 2014 audit report of Gazprom, Russia sold 15 percent less gas in 2014 than in 2013, which 




Was the SSPP merely another EU-Russia trade dispute, comparable to railway tariff disputes with the Baltic 
States or the timber tax dispute with Finland? The analysis and process tracing presented here disagrees with 
that notion, emphasizing that the SSPP was a strategic priority for Russia that became a victim of the Russian 
leadership’s Ukraine adventurism, or even “one of the biggest casualties of the East-West stand-off over 
Ukraine”.177 Furthermore, the geoeconomic perspective underscores that the SSPP case is more than a trivial 
tug of war over a pipeline project. As indicated by the process tracing exercise, Russian leadership estimated 
in the spring of 2014 that it could advance two European strategies simultaneously: a geoeconomic one 
(constructing SSPP) and a geopolitical one (the military campaign in Ukraine). Here, Putin, frequently 
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described by political commentators as a master strategist,178 overplayed his hand. The EU is still searching 
for a common overall policy to confront Russian aggression in Ukraine, but in the pipeline politics Putin 
seems to have succeeded in increasing unity, to a certain degree, among the objects of his policy. From 
March 2014 onwards, the EU was able to harden its line on SSPP. The global energy context, including 
cheap coal prices, expansion of renewable energies, more liquefied natural gas and spot trading, cannot fully 
account for the assertiveness of the EU Commission and the allegiance of Member States in the SSPP case. 
On a more general level, the SSPP case study highlights the incompatibility of geoeconomic 
and traditional geopolitical strategies. Europe’s dependence on Russia for gas has been widely viewed as 
limiting the scope of the EU’s response to Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine.179 The other perspective, 
the harm to Russian geoeconomic power caused by the geopolitics in Ukraine, has not been adequately 
addressed or analyzed. Russian geoeconomic activity has long been successful as a centrifugal, dividing 
power within the EU. The geopolitical campaign in Ukraine, in stark contrast, has been a centripetal force, 
causing enhanced EU unity, eventually seen for example in the SSPP case. Similar centripetal tendencies 
caused by a perceived geopolitical threat can be witnessed in the emerging German leadership in EU foreign 
policy,180 the economic sanctions imposed against Russia,181 and the re-emerging wider discussion on an 
energy union.182 Although contemporary analysts are keen to evoke Von Clausewitz,183 it seems that claims 
of geoeconomics being a continuation of war by other means are analytically poor and potentially 
misleading. The means of geopolitical power projection and tools of geoeconomic power have notably 
different effects in the contemporary, interconnected world.  
As Makarychev asserted, “Russia and the EU build their policies on drastically dissimilar 
concepts of power and divergent conceptualizations of the state and its functions”.184 If geopolitics and 
geoeconomics are competing strategies (for Russia), so are geoeconomics and economic liberalism (for the 
EU). The heritage of the 1990s, promoting liberal order and interdependency to enhance regional security, 
may hinder the EU’s ability to play geoeconomic games with strategically-oriented, state-capitalist Russia. 
For a considerable time, Brussels, operating through the emulation of the acquis communautaire, has pressed 
Gazprom and its partners to comply with EU rules on energy markets and competition. Among the main 
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concerns has been third-party access to pipelines, the unbundling of network ownership and gas supply, and 
the tariff structure for pipeline use. The political essence of these rules is that the EU Commission is trying to 
limit Russian geoeconomic power by creating a resilient single market – or more realistically a variant of 
“regulated competition”,185 the second-best outcome after a liberal market-based order. Russia, on the other 
hand, has launched a dispute over the EU’s third energy package at the World Trade Organization.186 This is 
rather an unusual but a positive move for Russia as the WTO dispute settlement mechanism provides an 
independent, rule based system of adjudication which Russia has continuously avoided in the past.  
In spite of the recent centripetal tendencies, Member States have naturally supported different 
political responses to Russian geoeconomic activity in the energy sector. Different understandings of or 
disregard for EU solidarity as well as unilateral actions to deal with Russian geoeconomics will test the 
Union’s internal cohesion in the future. It is crucial to note that the national positions within the EU are not 
straightforward derivatives of energy trade with Russia. For example, Russian gas makes up a larger share in 
the primary energy consumption of Finland than that of Poland.187 Therefore, one can argue that Poland’s 
frequent and vocal criticism toward Russian energy geoeconomics – notably the Nord Stream and South 
Stream pipelines – is not about energy security as such, but rather about conventional security policy. Poland 
assumes, to a certain extent, that the less sovereign Ukraine becomes, the more security concerns Poland will 
face from the East.188  
The years of struggle for the SSPP will leave a scar on EU-Russia energy relations. The 
geoeconomic wrangling over the rules of the natural gas trade in Europe continues in negotiations between 
Brussels and the Kremlin, in national election campaigns in several EU member states, in corporate 
boardrooms, and in civil litigation across Europe. Although the ultimate outcome hangs in the balance, the 
idea of Russian energy invincibility, in which “energy politics may ultimately define the shape of relations 
between Russia and the West during this latest crisis in Ukraine”,189 has been compromised by the demise of 
the SSPP. 
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